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Abstract—Since  most  of  the  recent  agricultural 
biotechnology  innovations  have  been  developed  by 
private companies, the central focus of societal interest 
is  on  the  distribution  of  the  gains  from  these 
technologies  among  all  stakeholders.  In  a  partial 
equilibrium model, assuming perfect corporate pricing 
strategies  given  the  heterogeneous  population  of 
potential adopters, we model the worldwide introduction 
of GM sugar beet. The introduction is modelled under 
both the old and new CMO for sugar in the EU. We see 
GM  sugar  beet  could  bring  great  benefits  to  both 
consumers in the world and sugar beet producers even 
when the innovation is protected by intellectual property 
rights and the innovator uses his restricted monopoly to 
the full extend. 
Keywords— GM, sugar beet, partial equilibrium 
I. INTRODUCTION  
Since  most  of  the  recent  agricultural  biotechnology 
innovations have been developed by private companies, the 
central focus of societal interest is not on the rate of return 
to research, but on the distribution of the gains from these 
technologies  among  all  stakeholders  involved  in  the 
agribusiness chain, i.e. input suppliers, farmers, processors, 
distributors, consumers and government. The first ex post 
impact  studies  of  agricultural  biotechnology  indicate  that 
farmers  are  clearly  capturing  sizeable  gains  of  the  new 
technology [1]. 
In Europe, only a limited number of countries have been 
growing GM crops so far and only a few ex post welfare 
studies have been published, i.e. on Bt maize in Spain [2,3] 
and herbicide tolerant soybeans in Romania [4]. Some ex 
ante EU distributional impact studies on transgenic sugar 
beet  are  documented  as  well  [5-7],  reporting  a  global 
welfare increase of €1.1 billion during the five-year period 
1996-2000,  shared  among  EU  producers  (26%),  the  seed 
industry (24%) and the rest of the world (50%).  
Despite  the  official  end  of  the  moratorium  and  new 
approvals of GE crops, adoption of national guidelines on 
coexistence has been relatively slow and due to regulatory 
uncertainty  and  consumer  hostility,  the  adoption  of  GM 
crops is still limited. This means that the EU is still in a 
state of quasi-moratorium regarding the introduction of GM 
crops,  foregoing  important  benefits  of  these  new 
technologies.  
However, with the recent trends in world food and bio-
energy markets it seems like the tide is changing and the 
demand  for  introduction  from  GM  crops  increases  in  the 
European  Union.  In  this  study  we  assess  the  potential 
introduction  of  herbicide  tolerant  (HT)  sugar  beet  under 
changing sugar policies. 
II. MODEL 
The  case  of  HT  sugar  beet  is  very  appealing  for  EU 
agriculture  as  this  crop  is  grown  in  most  EU  countries. 
Moreover,  weed  control  is  crucial  to  economic  beet 
production [8], which makes the HT trait very attractive to 
farmers. The case of sugar beet is very current. It seems the 
sugar  industry  opened  its  doors  towards  HT  sugar  beet 
which is commercialized in the USA in 2008. Furthermore, 
sugar beet is a potential input commodity for the growing 
bio-energy  sector  and  the  biochemistry  sector.  Dillen, 
Demont  and  Tollens  [9]  develop  a  framework  to  model 
heterogeneity among potential adopters in ex ante welfare 
assessments  which  allows  determining  the  marginal 
adopter, endogenizing the technology fee and adoption rate 
in the case of monopolistic price setting. They also calculate 
farmer rents and the revenue for the innovator. However, 
Frisvold,  Sullivan,  and  Raneses  [10]  argue  distributional 
effects cannot be assessed adequately without aggregating 
results and incorporating market effects.  Therefore we use 
the EUWABSIM model to assess the distributional effects 
[5,11,12]. The model covers 19 agricultural seasons (1996-
2014) and as such takes into account the introduction of 10 
New Member States in 2004 and the change in the sugar 
policy  in  2006  (cfr.infra).  EUWABSIM  is  based  on  the 
large open-economy framework of Alston et al. [13], but 
explicitly recognises that research protected by intellectual 
property rights generates monopoly profits [14]. It is framed 
to  the  policy  and  market  features  of  the  EU  Common 
Market  Organization  (CMO)  for  sugar  as  modelled  by 
[15,16]. The model starts from non-linear constant-elasticity 
(NLCE)  supply  functions,  developed  by  Moschini  et  al. 
[17],  incorporating  technology-specific  parameters,  which 
enable  the  detailed  parameterisation  of  the  herbicide   2 
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tolerance technology. Seventeen regions are included, each 
of them modelled by a NLCE supply function: fourteen EU 
regions before 2004 and 17 thereafter (resembling 92% of 
EU 27 sugar production), the Rest of the World (ROW) beet 
region, and the ROW cane region. This specification allows 
technology  spillovers  to  be  included  for  the  ROW  sugar 
beet  region.  The  seventeen  EU  and  two  ROW  supply 
functions  are  aggregated,  respectively  into  an  EU  and  a 
ROW aggregate supply function. The model is non-spatial, 
since intra-EU trade flows are not modelled; only aggregate 
EU and ROW demand for sugar are taken into account. The 
differentials  between  aggregate  supply  and  demand 
functions  result  in  an  EU  export  supply  function  and  a 
ROW  export  demand  function,  since  the  EU  is  a  net 
exporter and the ROW a net importer of sugar. By imputing 
a hypothetical adoption curve for HT sugar beet into the 
model,  the  technology-specific  parameters  engender  a 
pivotal  shift  of  the  regional  NLCE  supply  functions  and 
hence  of  the  export  supply  and  demand  functions.  The 
world price is modelled as the intersection of both functions 
on the world market. For  the former sugar policy, changes 
in  the  world  price  are  transmitted  to  domestic  EU  prices 
through the auto-financing constraint of the CMO for sugar 
[16]. Finally, the welfare changes (producer and consumer 
surplus) are calculated via standard procedures [18]. In the 
next paragraphs  we highlight some of the  features of the 
model the EUWABSIM model. 
A. The former Common Market Organisation for sugar 
The technology induced world price change can be 
transmitted to EU domestic prices using the principles of 
the  EU’s  CMO  for  sugar,  which  came  into  full  effect  in 
1968. The key features include a minimum price and the 
creation of production quotas. Anticipating an increase in 
consumption,  the  quotas  are  set  at  a  higher  level  than 
internal  consumption.  This  overproduction,  although 
receiving  a  guaranteed  B  sugar  price,  is  exported  on  the 
world  market  and  hence  subsidised.  This  export  subsidy 
system is completely auto-financed by levies on A and B 
quota  production.  Consumers,  who  pay  a  high  internal 
intervention  price,  subsidise  the  internal  within-quota 
production.    Both  the  levies  on  A  and  B  quota  serve  to 
satisfy  the  auto-financing  constraint  AFCj,  which  is  a 
function of the world price, while the latter is a function of 
worldwide adoption [16].  The levies have to fill the gap 
between  the  world  price  and  the  high  internal  price  for 
quota  production  which  is  in  excess  of  consumption  and 
exported on the world market. For each Member State, A 
and B quota prices can be deducted from the institutional 
price and the levies. Thus, the producer price is endogenous 
since it depends on sugar production, internal demand and 
the gap between the intervention and the world price. All 
out-of-quota production is called ‘C sugar’ and can either 
be: (i) stocked to be carried over to the following marketing 
year, enabling to smooth out annual production variations, 
or (ii) exported on the world market at the world price, i.e. 
without export subsidies. 
Finally, the EU’s CMO for sugar contains some additional 
features, such as the African Caribian Pacific (ACP) import 
arrangements, conferring free access to the EU market for 
ACP  countries,  up  to  a  certain  maximum  limit.  These 
arrangements  are  essentially  aid  flows  accruing  to  ACP 
countries  and  are  omitted  from  our  welfare  framework, 
since they do not affect the flow of research benefits. The 
same argument holds for the EU’s stocking and carrying-
over policy, at least in the medium- and long-run. 
To calculate the producer surplus, which strongly depends 
on  the  competitiveness  of  the  different  countries  a 
categorical  parameter  to  denote  the  region’s  production 
efficiency  is  introduced.  Depending  on  the  value  this 
parameter  takes,  the  model  automatically  selects  the 
appropriate  formula  for  the  calculation  of  the  welfare 
effects,  depending  on  their  incentive  for  production.  For 
detailed formulas see [7]. 
B. #ew Common Market Organisation for sugar 
(2006/2014) 
On  the  first  of  July  2006  a  new  CMO  for  sugar  was 
introduced.  The  key  features  of  the  reform  are  (i)  a 
progressive cut of the EU institutional price (the reference 
price)  up  to  36%  over  four  marketing  years,  (ii)  direct 
compensatory payments of 64.2% of the estimated revenue 
loss  over  three  marketing  years  and  (iii)  a  single  quota 
arrangement for the term 2006/07-2014/15.  The goal of this 
reform is to reduce domestic EU sugar production in order 
to comply with WTO, EBA and the commitment of the EU 
to make agriculture more competitive. In order to facilitate 
this  reduction  in  production,  a  buy-out  scheme  is  setup. 
Sugar  producers  giving  up  production  due  to  the  lower 
prices  can  sell  their  quota  to  the  EU  for  an  in  time 
decreasing amount (€730-€730-€625-€520/ton). This should 
stimulate less competitive producers to reduce or abandon 
production. If the reduction in production is insufficient in 
2010,  the  EU  can  decide  on  a  linear  quota  cut  for  all 
European  producers  in  order  to  reach  the  goals  of  the 
reform.  
For  the  model  this  has  several  structural  effects.  The 
older differentiated quota are replaced by one quota with a 
price  independent  from  the  world  market  price,  the 
reference  price.  The  characterisation  of  production 
competitiveness  changes  for  all  countries.  Producers  not 
filling their assigned quota before, will sell excess quota and   3 
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fill their new quota. Producers filling their quota before will 
keep on doing this although some selling of quota can occur 
due to the reduced sugar prices. Having quota but not filling 
them is taxed by a restructuring amount to be paid on each 
quota,  a  further  incentive  to  sell  excess  quota.  Countries 
which reacted on world market prices before are affected 
the most. Due to a complaint by the WTO, export of out of 
quota sugar (former C-sugar) is severely constraint. Total 
export from is limited by the WTO to 1.4million ton white 
sugar/year. Since this allocation is first filled with excess 
quota  sugar  (as  long  as  the  budget  is  sufficient)  and  can 
only be used for out of quota sugar in special cases, there 
aren’t  any  possibilities  to  produce  for  the  world  market. 
However,  under  the  new  CMO  for  sugar,  the  possibility 
exists to produce industrial sugar outside quota production. 
Competitive producers will produce sugar for industrial use 
which  means  European  industrial  users  will  import  less 
sugar off the world market. This decrease in demand on the 
world market makes the EU still influence the world market 
to some extent. In 2009 the Everything but Arms agreement 
will grant free access to the European sugar market for the 
least developed countries (LDC). However, the combination 
of lower prices for ACP countries with the free access for 
LDC will keep the European import only slightly changed 
[19] so it can be assumed exogenously. 
III. DATA AND MODEL CALIBRATION 
In our simulation model we assume hypothetically that both 
the EU’s beet sugar industry, being a competitive player in 
the world market, and the ROW beet region embraced the 
new  technology  since  the  marketing  year  1996/97,  and 
progressively  adopted  it  up  to  2014/15.  Our  model  is 
calibrated on the observed production data from this period. 
Observed yields, ‘incentive prices’ (see below), London n°5 
world sugar prices, quantities  and quota  are taken from 
various sources [20-24]. Data for the future come from the 
FAPRI model, extrapolations of historical trends (yield/ha) 
and from decision 290/2007 from the EU. We assume only 
the efficient producers,  produce industrial sugar and this up 
to an amount of 1.5 million ton [25] shared weighted on 
their quota. The other Member States are assumed to just 
fill their new quota. All cost and price data are first deflated 
and actualised to the agricultural season 2006/07 using the 
GDP  country  deflators  form  the  world  development 
indicators, and then converted to Euro using the exchange 
rate  of  2006.  Institutional  prices  are  deflated  using  both 
agricultural and financial exchange rates. Because HT sugar 
beet is not yet adopted, we estimate the adoption parameters 
of a comparable technology in the USA, i.e. HT Roundup 
Ready®  soybeans[26].  Therefore,  we  first  transform  the 





















.  (1) 
As a benchmark for HT sugar beet in the EU, we assume 
a  logistic  adoption  curve  with  the  same  constant  of 
integration, aρ,US, and adoption speed, bρ,US, as in the US. 
By  assuming  a  adoption  ceiling  of  ρmax,US  =  0.9,  the 
estimated OLS parameters using linear regression are aρ,US 
=  2.49,  and  bρ,US  =  0.61.  We  assume  a  uniform  pricing 
strategy  [9]  in  which  the  innovating  firm  sets  their 
technology fee in 1996 upon introduction of the technology 
and in 2004 with the introduction of 10 New Member States 
since  production  structure.  ρmax,I  then  represents  the 
maximal adoption under the restricted monopoly held by the 
innovator. Distribution were created based on herbicide and 
application costs from Hermann [28,29] (Table 1). 
We allow technology spillovers to the ROW beet region, 
subject to the same adoption pattern, but assume a ceteris 
paribus  in  the  ROW  cane  region.  Since  we  are  only 
focusing on a single technology in a single sector, in our 
model the technology cannot ‘spillover’ to the ROW cane 
region. As a result, our estimated ‘welfare effects foregone’ 
have  to  be  interpreted  as  functions,  conditional  on  the 
assumed counterfactual adoption pattern. 
As we carry out the analysis from an ex ante perspective, 
i.e. before adoption has taken place, the relevant adoption 
data (yield increases, cost reductions) are not yet available. 
Moreover,  the  estimation  of  certain  parameters,  such  as 
elasticities, is surrounded by uncertainty. Therefore, using 
the  computer  program  @Risk  from  Palisade  Corporation, 
we construct subjective distributions for these parameters, 
using all prior information available. Through Monte Carlo 
simulations,  stochastic  distributions  are  generated  for  the 
outcomes of the model. 
Technology-induced cost reduction estimates are crucial 
to  economic  surplus  calculations.  Dillen,  Demont,  and 
Tollens  [9]  calculated  the  rents  accruing  to  farmers  for 
2004.  We  repeated  their  calculations  for  1996  upon  the 
hypothetical introduction of HT sugar beet.  
We assume that the ROW beet area is able to achieve the 
same efficiency gain and use the area-weighted average of 
the EU-27 Member States’ efficiency gains.  
To  calibrate  the  model,  we  need  to  define  regional 
‘incentive  prices’  for  all  regions  depending  on  the 
categorical parameter introduced earlier. For the ROW the 
world  price  is  used.  For  EU  regions,  the  incentive  price 
depends  on  the  region’s  production  efficiency  and  the 
national  pricing  system  applied  to  pay  beet  growers  and 
processors.   4 
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Table 1 Densities of herbicide expenditures and the the calculated technology fee and adoption rates 
  Shape parameter of the logistic PDF on 
herbicide expenditures 
γ                                                 δ  
  tech fee 
(€/ha) 
  Maximal adoption 
ρmax,i,j 
  1996  2004  1996  2004  1996  2004  1996  2004 
Belgium  163.74  206.59  8.39  4.23  98  88  89%  91% 
Denmark  165.51  165.51  4.40  4.35  98  88  88%  92% 
Germany  202.04  160.33  5.00  3.94  98  88  90%  69% 
Greece  223.55  121.06  9.06  10.52  98  88  99%  63% 
Spain  265.37  222.94  5.52  6.09  98  88  100%  100% 
France  124.76  135.78  4.81  9.71  98  88  43%  89% 
Ireland  196.52  84.422  9.97  9.68  98  88  93%  1% 
Italy  184.83  145.32  5.78  6.37  98  88  74%  53% 
The Netherlands  123.5  164.32  3.27  13.48  98  88  69%  100% 
Austria  229.12  260.8  4.73  5.43  98  88  87%  96% 
Portugal  265.37  265.37  5.52  5.52  98  88  99%  100% 
Finland  266.13  200.67  6.51  10.04  98  88  99%  100% 
Sweden  139  148.56  3.50  4.29  98  88  47%  60% 
United Kingdom  124.05  124.05  5.93  5.93  98  88  66%  73% 
Czech Republic    180.12    9.99    88    92% 
Hungary    132.28    2.73    88    46% 
Poland    184.91    6.40    88    87% 
 
 
 The incentive prices for the former CMO for sugar are 
modelled in a dynamic way and depend on the world price, 
which, on its turn, depends on world-wide adoption rates. 
Incentive prices can be A sugar prices, B sugar prices, a 
region-specific mixed price, or the world price. For the new 
CMO  for  sugar  the  incentive  price  for  in  quota  sugar  is 
fixed  (although  decreasing  in  time)  and  the  out  of  quota 
incentive  price  is  the  world  price.  Dillen  et  al.  [12] 
introduce  a  multicriteria  decion  tool  to  assign  the  right 
incentive price to different Member States.   
   Since our model features disaggregated area response 
and yield response to prices, we need to find elasticities that 
correctly represent farmers’ behaviour and incentives in the 
global  sugar  beet  industry.  In  a  quota  system  with  fixed 
prices, annual within-quota price variation is too small to 
obtain reliable estimates of supply response. While quota 
rents  of  world  price  irresponsive  regions  are  not 
significantly  affected  by  supply  response,  world  price 
responsive  regions  significantly  affect  world  prices  and 
global welfare through technological innovation. Therefore, 
for  these  regions  in  particular,  i.e.  Germany,  Belgium, 
France,  Austria  and  the  UK,  precise  estimates  of  supply 
response  to  world  prices  are  needed.  Poonyth  et  al.  [30] 
report short- and long-run area elasticity estimates for all 
EU-15  Member  States,  except  Portugal  and  Greece.  As 
Poonyth et al. [30] do not include any standard deviations 
for  the  elasticities,  we  construct  symmetric  triangular 
distributions with the short-run estimate as minimum value, 
the long-run estimate as maximum value and the medium-
run, i.e. the average of both estimates, as most likely value. 
For the export supply flexibilities, we construct symmetric 
triangular  distributions,  centred  on  the  base  value  and 
ranging from zero to twice the base value. Devadoss and 
Kropf  [31]  report  supply  elasticities  for  all  major  sugar 
producers in the world. For the ROW cane and ROW beet 
regions, we calculate a production-weighted average supply 
elasticity  of  0.269  and  0.207,  respectively,  and  a 
consumption-weighted average demand elasticity of -0.034. 
For Greece and Portugal we use Devadoss and Kropf’s [31] 
supply elasticity estimate of 0.228 for A quota sugar. As 
supply  elasticities  already  incorporate  yield  response  to 
prices, we set yield elasticities to zero for these regions. For 
EU-27 regions we use the yield response to prices from the 
ESIM-model  [32],  0.08,    surrounded  by  a  triangular 
distribution  constructed  analogously  to  the  rest  of  the 
elasticities. The ESIM-model also supplies us with supply 
elasticities for the New Member States.   5 
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IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
We  conduct  a  Monte  Carlo  simulation  of  6000 
simulations  to  generate  stochastic  distributions  for  our 
welfare  estimates,  using  the  @Risk  software.  Table  4 
reports the  mean values. The downstream  sector captures 
the largest share (61%) of the benefits. This result is in line 
with the ex post impact studies on first generation GM crops 
which  show  a    distribution  of  2/3  downstream,  1/3 
upstream. 31% of the benefits accrues to the ROW if we 
assume that beet producers in these countries are able to 
achieve  the  same  efficiency  enhancing  effects  trough  the 
new technology, and are not able to export the technology-
induced export on the  world  market  which  would further 
erode  the  world  market  price.  Worldwide  sugar  beet 
growers gain €8.22 billion almost equally shared between 
EU-27 producers (58%) and ROW producers (42%). The 
input suppliers (seed industry and gene developers) extract 
€6.07 billion of the global welfare gain. If we do not take 
into account any market effects, 58% of the benefits flow to 
the beet growers, while 42% accrues to the input industry. 
The  depressing  effect  on  world  prices  engendered  by 
innovating  world  price  responsive  regions  causes  ROW 
consumers to gain €8.64 billion, but this is largely offset by 
the  ROW  cane  growers’  loss  of  €7.25  billion.  Since  we 
assume  that  the  technology  spillovers  to  the  ROW  beet 
sector do not depress the world price, the EU is not affected. 
Instead,  the  world  price  responsive  EU  region  is  able  to 
erode its own profitability through technological innovation, 
an  ambiguity  called  ‘immiserising  growth’  [33],  but  our 
results  show  that  the  CMO  for  sugar  largely  protects 
domestic  producers  against  this  perverse  side  effect  of 
innovation. The model suggests a world price decrease of  
1.6%  is  expected  to  occur  over  a  period  of  19  years,  a 
annual  decrease  of  1.3%.  Compared  with  other  studies, 
reporting annual price declines of 0.64% due to the adoption 
of Bt cotton in the USA [34] and 0.88% [17] and 0.97% 
[35] due to the adoption of Roundup Ready® soybeans in 
the USA and South America, our estimate is relatively big 
but this is due to the bigger time span of our study. 
Since EU institutional prices are exogenously fixed, no 
important  price  declines  are  possible.  As  a  result,  the 
benefits  essentially  flow  to  farmers  without  affecting  EU 
processors and consumers. However, if weed control based 
on  transgenic  HT  technology  increases  the  sugar  beet’s 
sucrose content [36], processors will gain as the processing 
costs are approximately the same per ton of beets regardless 
of  sugar  content  [37].  Moreover,  if  the  EU  government 
endogenised  public  and  private  agricultural  research 
expenditures [see e.g. 38] in the CMO for sugar, benefits 
would be shared among farmers and consumers. The global 
welfare  gain,  finally,  amounts  to  €15.68  billion  after  19 
years of adoption. 
As  we  assume  no  supply  response  for  the  majority  of 
beet producers, the enhanced yields of the new technology 
engender important land contractions in the beet industry. 
The last column of Table 4 presents the average land supply 
response (LSR). Our model predicts that due to the adoption 
of HT sugar beet, the EU-27 beet area will shrink 1.2% on 
average. World price irresponsive Member States’ areas are 
expected  to  decline  between  1.99%  and  4.29%,  whereas 
world  price  responsive  regions  are  expected  to  allocate 
more land to sugar beet, i.e. between 0.18% and 0.63%, in 
response  to  increased  profits.  The  ROW  beet  region  will 
remove 2.75% of sugar beet area from cultivation, while the 
ROW cane area shrinks with 0.37%. On the global scale, 
the sugar industry is expected to contract its area allocation 
to sugar beet and cane with an average of 0.70%. 
In Table 2, we present some descriptive statistics of the 
generated welfare estimates. Given the assumed subjective 
distributions, reflecting the uncertainty in the data, EU-27 
producer  surplus  ranges  from  €  3,750  billion  to  €5,347 
billion in 95% of the cases. Total welfare increase is lest 
robust, ranging with the same probability from €12.5 billion 
to €18.5 billion. 
 
 
Table 2 Descriptive statistics of the distribution of the aggregated impact of HT sugar beet on EU-27 agriculture, input 
suppliers and the ROW (1996-2014) 
  Minimum  2.5% confidence limit




EU-27 producers  3,245.4  3,750.6  4,523.0  5,346.9  5,997.8 
EU-27 consumers  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Net ROW  2,563.1  3,365.5  4,848.3  6,333.0  7,414.9 
Input suppliers  4,310.1  4,777.4  6,068.9  7,354.9  7,837.6 
Total  10,998.6  12,511.7  15,440.3  18,462.3  20,160.7 
a Lower limits are rounded up while lower limits are rounded down.   6 
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Table 3 Normalised regression coefficients of the impact of HT sugar beet on the world sugar price, EU-27 agriuculture , 


















Short run supply 
elasticity  0.905  0.094  0.905  0.709  -0.905  -0.088  0.003  -0.020 
Long run supply 
elasticity  0.375  0.039  0.375  0.293  -0.375  -0.037  0.000  -0.008 
Area elasticity 
ROW cane  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.016  0.000  0.009 
Area elasticity 
ROW beet  -0.004  0.000  -0.004  -0.003  0.004  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Yield change 
ROW  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.534  0.000  0.861  -0.052  0.444 
Yield change EU 
a 
-0.018  0.133  -0.018  -0.014  0.018  0.002  -0.001  0.038 
R
2 
0.982  0.997  0.982  0.989  0.982  0.998  1.000  0.999 
a The normalised regression coefficients are averaged over all EU regions. 
 
 
Normalized regression coefficients in Table 3 reflect the 
robustness of the model to individual parameter values. The 
coefficient  of  determination  R
2  is  high  in  all  regressions, 
which means the linear approximation explains the variation 
in the iterations. We investigate the coefficient for the most 
recent agricultural season, 2006/07, the sensitivity estimates 
for the other seasons being essentially the same. The short-
run flexibility ≤ 0, which can be interpreted as the inverse of 
the ROW export demand elasticity, is the  main driver of 
technology-induced world price movements. A higher short 
run flexibility implies a more elastic export demand curve, 
engendering (i) a smaller  technology-induced  world price 
decline,  (ii)  a  smaller  loss  for  all  farmers  (positive 
coefficient, columns 2, 3 and 4) and (iii) a smaller gain for 
ROW  consumers  (negative  coefficient,  column  5).  For 
global  welfare  gains,  the  opposing  effects  are  largely 
cancelling each other out. Sensitivities to the lagged sugar 
export supply expansion coefficient are smaller because of 
two reasons. First, we assumed a more narrow distribution 
for this parameter. 
Secondly,  as  we  assumed  a  monotonically  increasing 
adoption curve, lagged technology-induced EU sugar export 
supply expansions are smaller than actual expansions such 
that it has a smaller effect on welfare gains, regardless of its 
stochastic  distribution.  Any  yield  increases  have  an 
important  effect  on  global  welfare.  As  the  EU  model  is 
spatial,  each  region  features  a  separate  stochastic  yield 
boost  and  the  aggregate  effect  is  partly  cancelled  out. 
However, for individual world price responsive EU regions 
the coefficients are larger, ranging from 0.011 for Hungary 
to 0.162 for Germany. The ROW cane area benefits from all 
factors that prevent the EU (i) to achieve large efficiency 
gains in adopting HT sugar beet, e.g. small yield boost, and 
(ii) to export its surplus on the world market, e.g. an elastic 
export demand and/or inelastic supply. As the ROW cane 
region  does  not  innovate  in  our  model,  its  welfare  is 
essentially a function of the world sugar price. Therefore, 
the world price and the ROW cane region share the same 
regression  coefficients.  Table  3  reports  a  small  but 
significantly  negative  effect  of  a  yield  increase  on  input 
suppliers’ profits. In highly protected sectors, such as quota 
systems,  yield-enhancing  technologies  negatively  affect 
their own demand, as farmers  
who are irresponsive to world prices will decrease their land 
allocated  to  the  crop,  lowering  the  derived  demand  for 
enhanced seed. This phenomenon has long been observed in 
the  EU  market  for  sugar  beet  seed,  which  is  gradually 
decreasing due to increasing productivity and to decreasing 
acreage  [39].  Further  research  questions  include  the 
influence  of  the  new  sugar  policy  on  the  innovation 
incentive in the European sugar sector. Which farmers have 
the highest incentive to innovate their production process 
and how is the revenue of the seed developer affected by the 
new  sugar  policy.  Including  the  market  for  biofuels  or 
modeling the introduction of GM technologies in sugar cane 
production could also be included in further updates of the 
EUWAB model. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
Despite the granted intellectual property rights granted to 
the private innovation of HT sugar beet, the introduction of   7 
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HT  sugar  beet  could  created  significant  benefits  for 
different stakeholders; sugar beet farmers in Europe and the 
ROW,  consumers  in  the  ROW  and  the  innovators.  The 
innovation is modelled as priced perfectly by the innovator 
given  a  heterogeneous  population  of  potential  adoption. 
Even under this perfect corporate pricing strategy, 2/3 of the 
benefits accrue to farmers and consumers. The benefits are 
twofold,  cost reduction for farmers and a price reduction 
for consumers. The same effect of price decreases on the 
world market creates losses for the sugar cane sector, who 
can  not  benefit  from  spillovers  of  the  sugar  beet  sector. 
European  consumers  do  not  benefit  from  the  innovation 
because  of  the  regulated  internal  prices.  The  new  sugar 
regime alters the benefits generated by the innovators An 
important  side  effect  of  HT  sugar  beet  for  European 
agriculture is the land contraction taking place due to the 
higher yielding HT sugar beet. This land could be used for 
the  increasing  demand  for  raw  material  and  food  in  the 
coming years.  
The change of the CMO for sugar and the accession of 
several  new  Member  States  alters  the  flow  of  innovation 
rents due to reduced production, lower prices and reduced 
export.  However,  the  sharing-out  between  stakeholders 
stays at the 2/3  -1/3 level giving benefits  to farmers and 
consumers worldwide.   8 
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Table 4 Welfare effects of introducing HT sugar beet worldwide 
Year  1996/97  1997/98  1998/99  1999/00  2000/01  2001/02  2002/03  2003/04  2004/05  2005/06 
                     
Price  effects 
(%) 
                   
World  sugar 
price   99.6  99.6  99.4  99.1  98.9  98.7  98.7  98.5  98.6  98.7 
A sugar price   99.9  99.9  99.9  99.9  99.9  99.9  99.9  99.9  99.9  99.9 
B sugar price   99.8  99.8  99.7  99.7  99.2  99.5  99.2  99.3  99.6  99.4 
                     
Welfare effects  
(mill €) 
                     
Belgium  2.5  3.6  4.1  5.7  6.7  8.7  8.7  9.0  15.2  18.5 
Denmark  1.9  3.2  4.6  6.3  7.8  9.6  9.9  11.0  12.6  12.2 
Germany  12.7  18.5  24.5  31.1  39.8  48.1  48.2  49.1  44.2  53.6 
Greece  1.8  3.2  3.4  5.5  7.8  8.9  9.5  8.3  5.4  5.7 
Spain  9.1  15.5  22.0  30.3  38.1  44.5  44.9  50.8  45.9  44.1 
France  5.1  7.4  9.7  11.7  11.5  19.1  15.8  16.8  44.7  61.1 
Ireland  1.3  2.1  3.2  4.5  5.1  6.0  6.5  7.1  0.2  0.4 
Italy  5.7  9.2  13.6  18.6  22.7  27.1  28.7  34.4  21.9  21.8 
The 
Netherlands 
3.7  6.6  10.5  13.9  15.8  20.0  20.3  22.5  34.1  33.7 
Austria  1.4  2.1  2.7  3.4  3.9  5.3  5.2  5.2  8.2  10.8 
Portugal  0.0  0.8  1.2  1.8  1.9  2.5  2.4  3.0  3.0  2.9 
Finland  1.0  1.5  2.6  3.2  4.1  4.8  5.1  5.8  4.9  5.0 
Sweden  0.6  1.1  1.6  2.3  2.9  3.5  4.0  4.2  4.9  5.3 
United 
Kingdom 
2.6  4.0  4.9  6.0  6.5  9.5  8.6  9.0  13.3  16.4 
Czech 
Republic 
0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  15.4  14.9 
Hungary  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  9.1  8.6 
Poland  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  58.2  56.2 
EU-27 
producers 
49.5  78.8  108.7  144.3  174.7  217.5  217.5  236.1  341.3  370.9 
EU-27 
consumers 
0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 






-289.8  -300.0  -296.1  -310.0  -420.2 
ROW beet  39.6  67.4  90.0  115.4  154.4  161.5  187.0  182.0  175.1  207.9 
Net ROW 
producers 
-76.9  -47.8  -58.8  -49.1  -84.3  -128.2  -113.0  -114.1  -134.9  -212.2 
ROW 
consumers 
148.8  147.0  184.2  203.0  295.5  341.5  335.3  349.9  373.9  491.5 
Net ROW  71.9  99.2  125.3  153.9  211.1  213.3  222.3  235.8  239.0  279.3 
Input 
suppliers 
75.3  113.7  169.0  233.9  277.1  307.7  352.2  363.6  359.8  355.2 
Total  196.8  291.7  403.1  532.1  662.9  738.5  792.0  835.5  940.0  1005.4 
                     




                   
EU-27 
producers  
25  27  27  27  26  30  28  28  36  37 
EU-27 
consumers  
0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Net ROW   36  34  31  29  32  29  28  28  25  28 
Input 
suppliers  
38  39  42  44  42  42  45  44  38  35 
Total   100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100 
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Year  2006/07  2007/08  2008/09  2009/10  2010/11  2011/2012  2012/2013  2013/2014  2014/2015  AGGR  Land 
supply 
                      Response 
(%) 
Price  effects 
(%) 
                     
World  sugar 
price  
98.3  98.4  98.4  98.4  98.4  98.4  98.4  98.4  98.4     
                       
Welfare  effects 
(mill €) 
                     
Belgium  16.5  14.3  14.9  15.3  15.3  15.4  15.5  15.6  15.7  222.7  0.2 
Denmark  10.9  8.8  8.3  8.0  8.0  8.0  8.0  7.9  7.9  177.9  -3.1 
Germany  45.5  43.5  45.6  46.6  46.8  47.0  47.5  47.7  48.2  887.9  0.2 
Greece  5.1  2.4  2.2  2.1  2.1  2.1  2.1  2.1  2.1  115.0  -2.8 
Spain  27.0  22.2  21.2  20.4  20.3  20.3  20.3  20.2  20.2  691.0  -3.3 
France  56.8  43.6  46.3  47.8  48.0  48.5  49.1  49.5  50.1  603.3  0.3 
Ireland  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  63.8  -2.0 
Italy  10.8  9.7  9.2  8.8  8.7  8.7  8.7  8.7  8.7  389.5  -2.2 
The 
Netherlands 
22.6  18.1  17.1  16.4  16.4  16.4  16.3  16.3  16.3  389.1  -3.2 
Austria  9.4  7.8  8.2  8.3  8.3  8.4  8.4  8.5  8.5  127.3  0.6 
Portugal  1.6  0.9  0.8  0.8  0.8  0.8  0.8  0.8  0.8  36.0  -3.6 
Finland  4.8  2.7  2.6  2.5  2.5  2.4  2.4  2.4  2.4  78.9  -3.6 
Sweden  5.4  4.5  4.2  4.1  4.0  4.0  4.0  4.0  4.0  74.1  -2.0 
United 
Kingdom 
14.6  12.1  12.8  13.2  13.2  13.3  13.5  13.6  13.8  209.8  0.3 
Czech Republic  10.7  7.1  6.7  6.4  6.4  6.4  6.4  6.4  6.4  80.3  -4.3 
Hungary  5.9  3.8  3.6  3.5  3.5  3.5  3.5  3.5  3.4  45.1  -2.2 





233.8  234.5  233.4  233.7  234.5  235.8  236.5  237.7  4523.0  -1.2 
EU-15 
consumers 
0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  . 
ROW cane  -
520.8 
-478.3  -508.5  -537.7  -548.5  -561.3  -576.7  -590.0  -606.2  -7222.1  -0.4 
ROW beet  199.8  190.8  197.6  199.9  198.7  200.0  201.7  202.8  204.5  3460.7  -2.8 
Net ROW 
producers 
-321.0  -287.5  -310.9  -337.8  -349.8  -361.3  -375.0  -387.1  -401.6  -3761.4  -0.7 
ROW 
consumers 
601.3  569.4  597.3  629.1  644.4  661.8  683.0  701.2  723.3  8609.7  . 
Net ROW  280.3  281.9  286.4  291.2  294.7  300.5  307.9  314.1  321.7  4848.3  . 
Input suppliers  321.3  306.5  302.4  298.3  294.1  293.6  292.9  292.3  291.6  6068.9  . 
Total  889.4  822.2  823.3  822.9  822.6  828.6  836.6  842.9  851.0  15440.3  -0.7 
                       
Welfare 
distribution (%) 
                     
EU-27 
producers  
32  29  29  28  29  28  28  28  28  29   
EU-27 
consumers  
0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0   
Net ROW   31  34  35  35  36  36  37  37  38  31   
Input suppliers   36  37  37  36  36  35  35  35  34  39   
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